Vital incapacity- comentary on the ruling
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37767/2362-5325(2025)013Keywords:
Supervening incapacity, Personal injuries, Compensation for damages, Damage assessment, Indemnification, Appeal, Court of Appeals, Cassation appealAbstract
This paper presents a commentary on a judgment delivered by one of the Courts of Appeal of the city of Córdoba, in the context of a claim for damages arising from a traffic accident. In this case, the court was called upon to determine whether to uphold or, on the contrary,
to overturn the first-instance decision, which had fully admitted the claim and ordered the defendant and the insurer joined to the proceedings to pay various heads of damages, including compensation for the “loss of vital capacity” suffered by the claimant. The analysis focuses specifically on this latter aspect, as it provides a valuable opportunity to revisit key concepts in the field of tort law and to re-examine the criteria developed regarding this type of compensation. Furthermore, the case brings to mind the reasoning and principles set forth in the well-known “Dutto” precedent, which—some years ago—played a significant role in unifying judicial doctrine on the matter.